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REMARKS 



HON. J. H. BROMWELL. 

OF OHIO, 



HAWAIIAN ANNEXATION, 



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 



JUNE 14, 1898. 



W A S M I N O TOM. 

1898. 









^^' 



72949 



B E M A K K S 

OP 

HON. J. H. BEOMWELL 



The House liaving under oousideration the joint resohition ( H. Res. 259) to 
provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States- 
Mr. BROMWELL said: 

Mr, Speaker: After thirty years of peace at home and abroad 
we are to-day in the midst of war's alarm; the drumbeat and the 
bugle call once more resound throughout the land; gathering 
hosts are hurrying to the front; Old (llory waves over American 
soldiers marching in battle array; on our ships of war, more deadly 
than ever before, the crews stand ready for action; a naval victory, 
unique in the history of warfare, has placed the name of Dewey 
with those of Farragut, Decatur, and Nelson, and those of Bagley 
and Hobson fill the world with admiration. 

Another brilliant page is about to be added to the history of 
American triumph by land and sea over a hostile foe. Our arms 
are turned no longer against American soldiers and brethren in 
other States of the Union. The struggle is not maintained, as in 
the civil war, against the perpetuity of the American Govern- 
ment and the preservation of free institutions. We stand a united 
people in a united cause for a united purpose, to extend the priv- 
ileges of liberty to an oppressed people from the cruelty of a coun- 
try which has for hundreds of years been a disgrace to the civil- 
ization of the world, and to avenge an act of barbarism of which 
no other nation on earth would have been guilty save Spain. 

Side by side are the companies and regiments and brigades from 
the North and South. Northern soldiers will march under 
Wheeler and Lee, and Southern troops will fight with Miles and 
Merritt. On the quarter deck and in the gun rooms of our cruisers 
and battle ships will stand the men whose homes are on the Gulf 
with the men whose homes are on the Lakes. We have become a 
homogeneous people with one aim, one aspiration — the honor and 
glory of a common country. 

Thirty-five years ago the melodies of Dixie went up from one 
side of the armed fortifications, while the miisic of the Star 
Spangled Banner floated upward from the other. To-day the 
strains of both are heard in every camp and float across the water 
from every seacoast city on the oceans and the Gulf. In the 
armies which will ere long be marching through the Cuban Island 
will be found the children of Southern slaves, the children of 
their masters and of those who set them free, guided by a com- 
mon purpose, with a common motto, " Cuba libre." 

3iU 3 



LESSONS TO UK Dlt.VWN I'KO.M PKKSENT WAR. 

From sncli a war we can not, if we are wise, but draw lessons 
for our future conduct as a nation. We have slept for thirty- 
years contented with onr internal resources, strong in our ma- 
terial growth and development, self-contident to meet any strug- 
j:le in which we should be called to engage. We have reasoned 
that our isolation from the great powers of the other hemisphere 
would continue to bo our protection and our strength. We have 
forgotten the mighty progress which has been made in brmging 
more closely together the remotest corners of the earth. 

With no occasion to demand them, we have failed to keep 
abreast of the progress of the rest of the world in offensive and 
defensive preparations for war. While the first little monitor,' 
the product of American invention and genius, has revolution- 
ized naval warfare, wo have allowed ourselves to fall behind in 
our naval equipment/ until we have ceased to rank among the 
leaders in the matter of naval strength, and even the antagonism 
of a .sixth-rate power has found us unprepared for immediate ac- 
tion and filled with solicitude for immediate results. 

In the advancement of modern militarj- science requiring months 
of i)reparation f or the emplacement of modern batteries in ourse^T- 
coast fortifications and years for the construction of naval vessels 
and their armament and the manufacture of high-pov/er explo- 
sives, we can not afford, in time of peace, to neglect these great 
works until the call to war shall sound. When the Maine was 
blown up by the Spanish assassins not enough powder and shells 
were in the hands of the Ordnance Department to fight a single 
day's battle; not a fortification along the coast was in a condition 
to sustain the bombardment of a hostile fleet; not a sufficient force 
of troops, drilled and disciplined for active service, was at the dis- 
posal of the General Commanding the Armies for an invasion of 
Cuba. It has taken more than a hundred days of constant, unre- 
mitting, strenuous work to reach the point where we maj^ feel 
that we are at last prepared for offensive movements. I believe 
that this lesson will not have to be again repeated to the American 
people. 

In the history of England we read of one monarch, a Saxon 
king, who, surrounded by foreign foes, by procrastination failed 
to place his people in a proper condition to meet them, and his 
reign was a prolonged series of disasters. So conspicuous was 
this neglect that he has come down to us under the name of " Eth- 
elred the Unready." We have within our own experience seen 
even modem nations guilty of a similar blunder. France was 
overrun by Germany, China defeated by Japan, because they had 
not in time of peace properly prepared for time of war. Pray 
God that never in our history shall we be found, in a contest with 
a foreign nation, so unworthyas to be called "The United States 
the Unready." We have been daugerou.sly near it in the present 
instance. 

True, it costs vast sums of money to provide and maintain a 
naval armament and a coast defense which will put us on a fair 
footing of etiuality with the European powers; but the cost of 
hurried ])reparation, the expense of organizing and maintaining a 
preat army called together for an emergency, is far in excess of 
the outlay which would be required to place ourselves in a state 
of preparation in times of peace such as would make unnecessary 
in most, if not all, cases a state of war. 



NECESSITY OF COALING STATIONS. 

Another lesson which comes home to ns is the fact that it wonld 
not do for us as a nation to ignore the necessity of acquiring and 
maintaining in other parts of the world, even though remote from 
our shores, places of rest and supply for the vessels of oar Navy. 
In the days of Nelson and Decatur, when the wind was the only 
motive power, cruises of months or years could be made Ly a 
naval fleet without the necessity of stopping at a port. But with 
the introduction of steam and the harnessing of the lightning to 
perform so many of the functions of a ship of war the usefulness 
of a fleet or vessel is limited by its capacity to carry its own sup- 
ply of coal. 

However magnificent and almost invulnerable a modern battle 
ship may seem to be, it becomes a helpless derelict upon the face 
of the waters when its bunkers are empty of coal and its supply 
station remote. Were the necessities of our naval service con- 
fined to our own immediate waters this would be perhaps a mat- 
ter of little concern to us, for so long as our mines yield their 
stored-up treasures and our great railroad systems carry their 
black but precious loads to our seaboard, our ships of war could 
supply their needs under the protection of skillfully equipped and 
well-manned coast defenses. [Applause.] 

REVIVAL OF MERCHANT MARINE. 

But we should not forget that the hope is cherished that at no 
remote time in the future the great merchant marine of the United 
States shall again be rebuilt; that our commerce will be found on 
every ocean and in every inlet floating on American bottoms; that 
American citizens will be found either in the pursuit of business 
or pleasure in every city in every corner of the earth. It will be our 
duty to spread the protection of this glorious banner of freedom 
over every American, however humble; over every American ves- 
sel, however remote. 

To do this will require an American Navy to enforce our just 
demands and command the respect of even the most powerful na- 
tion. We shall build more ships, we shall train more men for 
this service, we shall make our coasts invulnerable, and we shall 
rank among the most powerful instead of among the weakest in 
our military and naval strength. Not for aggression, except in 
the cause of right; not for oppression or territorial aggrandize- 
ment, but for the enforcement of justice to our own people and 
protection of liberty and free government to the countries of this 
Western Hemisphere. With this necessity for the promotion of 
our naval welfare are intimately associated two great subjects 
which have demanded the attention of the American nation and 
which the present war will no doubt bring to a fitting conclusion — 
the annexation of Hawaii and the construction of the Nicaraguan 
Canal. 

NICARAGUAN CANAL. 

Their necessity has come home to us as it never could had it 
not been for the experience of the last three months. The run 
of our magnificent battle ship, the Oregon, through 13,000 miles 
of water, amidst not only the perils of the sea, but of the danger 
of attack by a hostile fleet, is a wonderful one in the history of 
naval warfare. But how many sighs have gone up, how many 
apprehensions have besn felt for her safety and that of her men, 
3Ut 



6 

which might have been spared had the shorter route through the 
Nicaraguan Canal been given her. We are sending relief to the 
gallant Dewey, adequate, I hope, even should a Spanish fleet be 
sent to the Pliilippines to recover those islands. 

With the great canal across the isthmus it would be at least an 
even race and a fair chance for our Atlantic fleet to succor Dewey 
and iiis gallant men. We need it for the proper defense of our 
western coast. We need it for the purpose of obviating the neces- 
sity of maintaining at a groat expense a double line of naval vessels 
wlion with it one alone would be sufficient. We need it to save 
the delay in sending our vessels from one coast to the other when 
the loss of a day might mean the destruction of lives and property 
more precious and valuable than any outlay we may make in its 
construction. We need it, too, in times of peace as well as in times 
of war. The great westei-n coast of South America should be the 
market for the manufactures of the East and the agricultural 
productions of the South and the great Mississippi Valley. 

We need it for the opening trade with the countries of eastern 
Asia, one day destined to eclipse all the other commerce of the 
world. We need it in times of war for our defense and in times 
of peace for our commerce. Before the dawn of the twentieth 
century I hope and I believe that it will be under way to its com- 
pletion. 

But important as this great enterprise is, we are confronted 
with the necessity of prompt action upon another far more im- 
portant from every standpoint and more urgent upon our de- 
mands for attention. That subject is the one now under discus- 
sion in this House — the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. 

COXSENSrS OF OPINION OF PUBLIC MEN. 

I can hope to add nothing new to the discussion that has occu- 
pied the attention and best minds of the country for the last fifty 
years. The messages of our Presidents; the state papers of our 
Cabinet officers, our ministers, and our consuls; the professional 
opinions of our best military and naval experts; the careful study 
and expression of judgment of leading statesmen of both Houses 
of Congress, and the editorial utterances of the great jiress of the 
country, ever the faithful reflector as well as the molder of the 
sentiments of the people at large, have united in one general, 
grand consensus of belief that it is a national duty which we owe 
to ourselves to annex these islands. 

While it is true perhajis that there is a certain amount of sen- 
timentality connected with this belief, arising from the fact that 
the progress of these islands from a state of paganism to the high- 
est plane of Christian civilization has been due to the efforts of 
American missionaries: that the development of her magnificent 
natural resources and the upbuilding of her commei-ce have been 
the result of American immigration; that the overthrow of a cor- 
rupt and dissolute monarchy and the establishment of a constitu- 
tional republican government, modeled largely from the pattern 
of our own, have been wrought by American sympathizers, there 
is added to this a practical phase of the question which appeals 
not only to our self-interest but to considerations of the highest 
iijiportance affecting our future welfare and protection. 

Divorcing, therefore, from our consideration of this subject all 
questions of mere sentiment, ignoring the fact that American in- 
terests dominate and control its aft'airs, shutting our eyes even to 
the sympathy which has heretofore existed between the two coun- 
:<llt 



tries, and which hcas made the Govcniinent of Hawaii during the 
present war assume the onerous duties and liabilities of an ally to 
this country instead of confining herself to the safe bounds of a 
neutral position, let us look at the question from the hard, prac- 
tical, selfish, if you will, standpoint of the benefits which will 
accrue to the United States from this annexation when com- 
pleted. 

Naturally a question of this kind divides itself into a consider- 
ation of the positive arguments in favor of the plan and an an- 
swer to the objections which are urged against it, but these are so 
inseparably connected that I shall not attempt to enumerate them 
as distinct from each other, for the answer to each objection that 
is raised forms of itself a link in the chain of the argument in 
behalf of annexation. 

STKATEGIC IMPORTANCE. 

The first argument in favor of the annexation of these islands 
is based upon their strategic value for the defense of our Pacific 
coast growing out of their unique and isolated position in the 
midst of the great Pacific Ocean and the limitations upon the ef- 
fectiveness of the modern vessels of war by reason of the absolute 
necessity of either carrying immense sux^plies of fuel or of having 
coaling stations at convenient intervals. 

Mahan, in his article in the Forum of March, 1893, says: 

The military or sti-ategic value of a naval position depends upon its situa- 
tion, iipon its strengtli, and upon its resources. Of the three, the first is of 
most consequence, because it results from tlie nature of things, whereas the 
two latter, wlien deficient, can be artificially supplied in whole or in part. 
Fortifications remedy the weakness of a position, foresight accumulates be- 
forehand the resources which nature does not yield on the spot; but it is not 
•within the power of man to change the geographical situation of a point 
which lies outside the limit of strategic effect. 

Let US examine from this standpoint the unique position of these 
islands. They stand at the center of a circle within a few hun- 
dred miles of whose circumference may be found the most im- 
portant points on the western coast of the United States, the 
southern shores of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, the eastern 
coast of Japan and the Polynesian Archipelago. Within easy 
steaming distance of the coaling stations of European powers in 
these eastern waters, no other nation on earth would hesitate to 
acquire i^ossession of them were the opportunity given as it is to 
the United States. The following table will show their distance 
from these most important points: 

Hawaii to— Miles. 

San Francisco 2, 080 

Nicaragua Canal 4, 210 

Tahiti 2,389 

Pagopago, Samoa 2, 26:5 

Auckland, New Zealand 3,850 

Fiji :3,736 

Marshall Islands 2,09S 

Caroline Islands 2,60'-': 

Hongkong 4.917 

Yokohama, Japan 3, 390 

Unalaska, Aleutian Islands 2,010 

Sitka 3,39.5 

Vancouver - -- 2,305 

The location of these islands with resp?ct to the nearest coaling 
stations of other nations is very concisely but comprehensively 
stated in the remarks of Mr. Draper, of Massachusetts, in this. 

3444 



House in February, 1894, from which I make the following qi:ota- 
tion: 

I'litil l^SC Hawaii was nearer to the territory of the United States than to 
that of anv other power, the distance to San Francisco l)eing but ;J,1(X) miles, 
rrliilo the liritish I'ortified jiort of Victoria, with its neighboring dockj-ard of 
Esquiinalt and coal mines of Nanainii-'. was :i.otJO miles distant. The next 
nearest British jwrt was Leonka, in Fiji group, 3,700 miles distant in an op- 
posite direction. 

French territory was 3,380 miles distant at Tahiti; Germany held the Ad- 
miralty Islands, distant ;J,UK) miles; and Spain the Caroline Islands, 2,000 
miles distant, and the I..adrones, about 2,!t00 miles distant. 

Since that time Germany has moved up to a distance of 2,098 miles by an- 
nexing the Marsliall Islands and placing herself in a tiaukiug position on both 
the South Pacilic and trans-Pacitic trade routes. 

Franco, by the acquisition of the Low Archipelago and the Marquesas 
Islands, is 2,0.">0 miles distant from Hawaii, on the South Pacific route. Great 
Britain has advanced from Fiji toward the intersecting point on clearly de- 
fined lines, annexing group after group and detached islands when they were 
in the lino of approach, even though uninhabited or without harbors or com- 
mercial value, until in 1891 her flag was planted on Johnston Island, 600 miles 
from Hawaii and the nearest point she can approach to her American terri- 
tory, unless the next move be the occupation of Hawaii itself. 

Hon. Lorin Thurston says: 

In the Pacific Ocean from the Equator to Alaska, from the coasts of China 
and Japan to the American Continent, there is but one spot where a ton of 
coal, a pound of bread, or a gallon of water can be obtained by a passing yes- 
Bel, and that spot is Hawaii. 

In the necessities of modern naval warfare, the architect is con- 
fronted by the three serious problems of formidable armament, 
invulnerable armor, and coal-caiTying capacity, and the nice ad- 
justment of these three elements in such a way as to procure, at 
the same time, the greatest speed is the one problem which is 
engaging the attention of naval experts throughout the world. 
Any one of these three features abnormally developed at the ex- 
pense of the others impairs the efficiency of the fighting machine. 

A battle ship or cruiser with large storage capacity for coal can 
carry proportionately fewer guns of lighter caliber and with arma- 
ment more liable to penetration by the modern projectile. So 
that while she might obtain the advantage of remaining long at 
eea without recoaling, she would at the same time be at a serious 
disadvantage in conflict with a vessel carrying heavier armor and 
throwing a greater weight of projectile to a greater distance. On 
the other hand, it matters not how impervious her armor or deadly 
her armament, if she can not carry within herself her means of 
locomotion, she becomes worthless except for purposes of coast 
defense. 

"A modern battle ship without coal is like a caged lion— mag- 
nificent, but harmless." 

So unanimous are modern strategists upon the importance of 
Hawaii as a strategic point tliat it has been aptly named and uni- 
versally referred to as "the key of the Pacific." Its importance 
to the United States as a means of protection to our western coast 
has attracted the attention of this Government for many years. 
General Schofield, who visited the islands under the instructions 
Of the Secretary of War in 1872, said: 



q)' . __ 

our commerce on the Pacific Ocean, they would afford the means of incal- 
culable injury to the United States. If the absolute neutrality of the islands 
could always bo insured, that would suffice; but they have not and never 
could liave the power to maintain their own neutrality, and now their neces- 

yiti 



9 

Bitioi? force them to seek alliance with some nation which can relieve their 
embarrassment. The British Empire stands ready to enter into such an alli- 
ance, and thus complete its chain of naval stations from Australia to British 
Columbia. We can not refuse the islands the little aid they need and at tho 
same time deny their right to seek it elsewhere. The time has come when 
we must secure forever the desired control over those islands or let it pass 
into other hands. The financial interest to the United States involved in 
this treaty is very small, and if it were much greater it would still be insipr- 
niflcant when compared to the importance of such a military and naval sta- 
tion to the national security and welfare. 

Quoting again from Captain Malian: 

Shut out from the Sandwich Islands as a coal base, an enemy is thrown 
back for supplies of fuel to distances of 3,500 or 4,000 miles— or between 7,000 
and 8,000 going and coming— an impediment to sustained maritime operations 
well-nigh prohibitive. The coal mines of British Columbia constitute, of 
course, a qualification to this statement; but upon them, if need arose, we 
might at least hope to impose some trammels by action from the land side. 
It is rarely that so important a factor in the attack or defense of a coast line— 
of a sea frontier— is concentrated in a single position, and the circumstance 
renders doubly imperative upon us to secure it if we righteously can. 

Admiral Eelknap reenforces these opinions in tlie following 
language: 

A glance at a chart of the Pacific will indicate to the most casual observer 
the great importance and inestimable value of those islands as a strategic 
point and commercial center. * * * Not to take the fruit witliin our 
grasp and annex the group now begging us to take it in would he folly 
indeed— a mistake of a gravest character, both for tho statesmen of the day 
and for the men among us of high commercial aims and great enterprises. 

OUR PRESENT NEED OF THE ISLANDS. 

But we need not depend upon the theoretical considerations 
which evolve the opinions of these distinguished experts. We are 
having to-day a practical illustration of the absolute necessity of 
these islands to the United States in the conduct of the war we 
are waging against Spain. Not a vessel that we are sending to 
Dewey's relief could reach him, not a battalion of the troops which 
are being carried on transports to complete the subjugation of 
Manila could be landed at that port, if we were deprived of the 
privilege of obtaining fresh supplies at this great halfway port in 
the long journey cross the broad expanse of the Pacific. It is not 
sufficient to say that when the war with Spain is ended there will 
be little occasion for offensive operations by American fleets and 
armies in the waters of eastern Asia. 

Little did we imagine before the present war that we should find 
it necessary to carry offensive operations to so remote a point aa 
the Philippines, and it will not do for us to blindly shut our eyes 
to the possibility of just such future contingencies again arising. 
We have learned the Issson that in a war with a foreign power 
we must be prepared for offensive as well as defensive action, and 
with every European nation stretching out for bases of supply 
from which their fleets may operate, and already forming a cordoa 
of advanced posts drawing nearer year by year to our Pacific 
coast, we shall soon be hemmed in on the west as we are now upon 
the east and south. With Hawaii in our possession we shall be 
reasonably secure. Without it, and especially in the hands of an 
unfriendly nation, we have a menace continually threatening us. 

I shall not comment upon the importance of these islands to us 
from a commercial standpoint, although their accession to our 
control would mean a vast increase in profitable commerce by ths 
investment of American capital and a rapid growth of our mer- 
chant marine for handling the trade of these islands. These mere 



10 

pecuniary and commercial considerations are so far overshadowed 
by their im])ortance to us for offensive and defensive inarposes 
that they may bo left out of consideration. 

POME OIIJELTIONS CONSIDEUED. 

And now lot us see what are some of the objections to and ar- 
guments aj^ainst the union that is proposed. 

The first, and what would be the most serious one if it were ten- 
able, is the claim that such action would be contrary to our own 
Constitution. 

This claim of unconstitutionality proceeds upon the theory that 
because there is not a distinct grant of power to annex territorj-, 
or because tlie territory is not contiguous, or because the character 
of its people is not similar to those of the territory now occupied 
by the United States, we have not the power to act. 

ANNEXATION OF TERRITORY ALREADY MADE. 

Fortunately these questions are not new and have all been set- 
tled by the highest authorities known to our system of govern- 
ment. While it may be true that the Constitution does not, in so 
many words, refer to our right to annex additional territory, as a, 
matter of fact we commenced such annexation in the very infancy 
of our Republic and have continued in that policy down to the 
present time. We have annexed by purchase, we have annexed 
by treaty, and we have annexed practically by conquest, or by 
treaty as a result of conquest. We purchased Louisiana in 1803; 
Florida in 1819; California, New Mexico, and Arizona, in 1849, 
came to us as a result of the Mexican war; we annexed Texas by 
joint resolution of Congress in 1844, and bought Alaska from Rus- 
eia in 18G7. We have occupied and practically annexed the Mid- 
way Island in the North Pacific, even farther from our coast than 
the Hawaiian Islands, and the right to make these annexations 
has been pas.sed upon by the highest constitutional authority in 
existence, the Supreme Court of the United States. 

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANNEXATION. 

Chief Justice Marshall, in 1 Peters, 542, said: 

The Constitution confers absolutely on the Government of the Union the 
power of ni;iking wars and making treaties. Consequently that Government 
possesses the power of acquiring tei'ritory, either by conquest or treaty. 

And this doctrine has been even more recently reaffirmed by the 
same court in the following words: 

The power to acquire territory is derived from the treaty-making power, 
and the power to declare and carry on war. 

The incidents of these powers are those of national sovereignty, and be- 
long to all independent governments. 

So much, then, for the objection that because the Constitution 
does not contain a specific grant of power we have no authority; 
for we see that this power to annex is a necessary consequence of 
our existence as a sovereign and independent nation. These de- 
cisions would seem to be broad enough to cover equally the other 
two constitutional objections, even it they were strictly new ques- 
tions. But here again -we have precedents, upon which no ques- 
tions have been raised, to establish our rights. The objection 
that Hawaii is not contiguous becomes of little importance when 
wo recall that the greater portion of the magnificent domain of 
Alaska is more remote from the nearest point of the rest of our 



11 

United States territory than is Hawaii and that we are separated 
from the former by the domain of a foreign government as well 
as by an equal stretch of ocean, and that the Midway Island and 
the Aleutian Islands are absolutely detached from contiguous 
territory. This objection, therefore, fails. 

CHARACTER OF INHABITANTS. 

That the inhabitants of Hawaii, or at least a majority of them, 
are of different race and civilization from those of the United 
States is undoubtedly true; but did not the same objection lie to 
the inhabitant of all the territory wliich we have annexed from 
the beginning? At the time of the Louisiana purchase the Indians 
far exceeded in number the white inhabitants, and the latter were 
largely made up of men alien to our civilization, laws, and cus- 
toms. Alaska contained nothing but a few Indian tribes, Esqui- 
mos, and Russian traders. In comparison with these the popula- 
tion of Hawaii would be far more desirable, for they have had the 
benefit of Christian education and the enlightening influences of 
commercial intercourse with civilized nations. 

The fear that we would not assimilate this population deserves 
but little consideration in the face of our experience with the im- 
migration from foreign countries and the rapidity with which 
within one or two generations at the most they become homoge- 
neous with our other citizens. Once in our possession, too, suit- 
able restrictions can be thrown around the further settlement of 
^ these islands by the undesirable class of Asiatics who have within 
• the last few years threatened to overwhelm with their numbers 
_j the white population. 

All other objections to the annexation of these islands seem to 
be based rather upon the question of the wisdom of the policy 
than upon the power to annex. One of the most frequently urged 
objections on this score is that its remoteness from the continental 
portion of the United States would render it an object of special 
attack by hostile nations and would entail upon us the necessity 
of keeping up a much greater navy and of entailing much heavier 
expenditures in order to protect it in time of war. Neither of 
these positions is, in the judgment of those best qualified to speak, 
tenable. 

WILL SAVE EXPENSE OF KEEPING UP LARGE NAVY IN THE PACIFIC. 

With Pearl Harbor, the only inlet upon any of the islands 
capable of receiving and protecting a fleet of large war vessels, 
well defended, and Honohilu, a few miles distant, properly forti- 
fied by American soldiers drawn from the Hawaiian residents, a 
mere handful of men and one or two battle ships or monitors could 
protect the island against any hostile fleet that might be sent 
against it. An attack, if made and unsuccessful, would almost 
necessarily mean the loss of the attacking fleet, for no vessels that 
could be sent from any other coal-supply station could run to 
Hawaii, remain any considerable time to make an attack, and then 
return to the station which it had left. Its coal bunkers would, 
long before its arrival, be exhausted, and it would be helpless and 
defenseless against not only a hostile fleet but even the elements 
themselves. 

As to the fear that it would require a greater Navy and entail 
greater expense to this Government, it would seem to be reason- 
able that if by maintaining two or three modern vessels of war at 
3il4 



the Hawaiian Islands we can absolutely prevent the approach of 
hostile fleets from eastern Asia, it would be far less expensive than 
maintaining a large number of vessels at each of our unprotected 
points upon the Pacific coast. An ounce of prevention would, in 
this case, be far better than a pound of cure. Especially does this 
argument become convincing should the Nicaraguan Canal be 
constructed and controlled by the United States, for then our ves- 
sels in the Atlantic Heet could reenforce our squadron in the Pa- 
cific before the vessels of a hostile power covild reach Hawaii from 
any except the nearest outlying station. 

It is the opinion of those best qualified to judge that its annex- 
ation will obviate the necessity for large expenditures rather than 
cause them. We have to take care of Hawaii in the sense of not 
allowing any other nation to occupy it. This doctrine we have 
affirmed and reaffirmed on many occasions, and it is now recog- 
nized and conceded by every nation on earth that we have that 
right. It is sufficiently within the sphere of the American influ- 
ence to bring it strictly within the provisions of the Monroe doc- 
trine, and on more than one occasion that doctrine has been 
invoked to prevent the occupation of those islands by other powers. 

If, therefore, we have this responsibility cast upon us, and re- 
membering that in carrying it out we may become involved at 
almost any time with another nation who finds it necessary to 
take military possession of them, how much wiser, easier, and 
less expensive it would be to us were we to exercise this control 
not as a mere protectorate over a little helpless nation, but as a 
part of our own independent and sovereign territory. 

lilGHT OF ItAWAIIAX GOVERNMENT TO ACT. 

As to arguments which are raised against the project for rea- 
sons growing out of the fact that the governing element of the 
island constitutes but a mere minority of the entire population, 
that a large number of its people are denied the right of suffrage, 
and tliat any proposition to annex should be submitted to a vote 
of the entire people instead of the Government now in existence, 
it is sufficient to say that none of these things have been regarded 
as of any importance in other cases in which we have acquired 
territory. With the exception of Texas, the consent of these peo- 
ple was neither asked nor received. 

The negotiations were conducted with the sovereign authorities 
controlling the territory. Even in the case of Texas the people 
themselves did not pass upon the question directly. It is sufficient 
for us to know, therefore, that there is a stable Government in 
these islands, which, acting under constitutional provision spe- 
cifically set forth, has the right to propose and consummate this 
annexation. This Government has been recognized by every civ- 
ilized nation not only as de facto but de jure. It has all the 
powers of sovereignty, including tliat of joining the island by 
cession to a foreign power. This has been universally recognized 
as a result of con(iuest and as i)reliminary to the sale or cession of 
territory by ijeaceful means. We are not hampered, therefore, 
by any (juestion of the power of the Government with which we 
will deal. 

Sl'MMAItV. 

The whole situation, therefore, seems to resolve it<elf into this: 
There is no constitutional prohibition, but, on the contrary, ample 
power; as to the policy which should control the Government, 



13 

there is no division of sentiment among those who have consiileved 
it from the standpoint of strategic necessity; as to its value for 
commercial purposes, the whole course of our official action, in- 
cluding the negotiation of treaties of commerce and reciprocity, 
bears evidence. We would need it at the present time as a mili- 
tary necessity, but even in times of peace we shall need it as a 
resting place for the fleet we shall have to keep in eastern waters 
and the relief and assistance which our peacelul commerce will 
need in its long passage across the Pacific. 

It comes to us without war, without bloodshed, without a for- 
eign complication, a voluntary donation of its own Government, 
its own freewill offering. It is asked for by the Administration 
as a necessity, and I am ready to grant the request. 
_ For my part, I do not fear that we shall depart from the tradi- 
tional ijolicy of our country of noninterference in the affairs of 
foreign nations, but I do believe that the surest safeguard against 
the interference of foreign governments in our affairs will be the 
enlargement of our naval armament, the procurement of stations 
scattered at suitable intervals as harbors of refuge and supply, 
the building of the Nicaraguan Canal, the retention of Puerto 
Rico as a guard to its entrance, and the annexation of Hawaii as 
the ' ' Key of the Pacific. " [Applause.] 

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